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ABSTRACT
The analogy between the myth of Narcissus, referred to as the intrinsic symbol of painting by Leon Battista Alberti; 
the typological value of self-portrait as an ontological and statutory reference; its value while metamorphosis of 
reality; and the self-representative phenomenon that Selfi e translates – all this has to be established and requires 
due consideration. When dwelling on the contemporary Selfi e we need to consider also the salvifi c dimension 
of this kind of self-representation mechanisms that have always been there. The value of image while self-
awareness mechanism compels us to question the fi eld of action where it is far more active – on social media. 
Its immanence is a true narcissistic affl iction.  The intrinsic and immediate value of image thus overlaps sign and 
word. The mechanisms of self-contemplation thus produced translate into a clear ontological impoverishment 
of reality. The Selfi e does not prevent the subject’s Kafkian metamorphosis, but renders reality vulgar, making 
it acceptable through both similarity and integration. Self-portrait and Selfi e are thus the ancestral mechanisms 
of self-preservation. Its origin derives from narcissistic mechanisms that require a continuous desire to stand out 
socially. However, while the pictorial self-portrait translates into epistemic valuation of its author, Selfi e delights 
in the vulgarization of the repetitive and banal gesture.  
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SELF-REPRESENTATION AS A LIBERAL ACHIEVEMENT – 
THE "AGE OF PRIVILEGE"
Consequently, I used to tell my friends that the inventor of pain-
ting, according to the poets, was Narcissus, who was turned 
into a flower; for, as painting is the flower of all the arts, so the 
tale of Narcissus fits our purpose perfectly. What is painting but 
the act of embracing by means of art the surface of the pool? 
(Alberti 2004, 61). 
The artist is respected because he promotes the eter-
nity of the memory of the “other” – and as such – is 
granted the exclusivity and glory of self-representation. 
Note, however, that its implementation also formalizes 
a clear epistemic conquest. By the mid-fifteenth century 
and before the advent of photography, the spell of self-re-
presentation forced painters to epistemologically harmo-
nize three fundamental achievements: verismo; pictorial 
space; and social awareness. The development of the 
absolute mimesis of reality would thus have had as its 
primary objective the faithful and truthful representation 
of the individual. From the fusion of these three concepts 
will be born the self-portrait and the selfie of the artist. 
Until the democratization of photography in the late ni-
neteenth century, self-portrait was thus totally restricted 
to the territory of painters, but conditioned to three con-
ditional reflexes: epistemic consciousness; social aware-
ness; and narcissism. In the treatise De Pictura that Leon 
Battista Alberti published in 14351, the invention of pain-
ting is attributed precisely to Narcissus. Alberti raises this 
question when he refers precisely to the statutory con-
quest of painters, hitherto regarded as mere craftsmen. 
The reflection of this ‘first’ painter – paradoxically fatal 
and virtuous – would henceforth institute painting as a 
perennial reflection of human nature, and in particular 
of his cultivators – the artists. The mirrored surface of 
water thus constitutes for Alberti the ideal metaphor to 
illustrate the magna function of painting as a checker of 
identity (Alberti, 2004: 61). The first glimpse the painter 
observed was precisely his reflection – the painting thus 
translates in an inducer of self-awareness. The depiction 
and understanding of the outer “Self” thus led to the un-
derstanding of the workings of the universe where the self 
moves and operates. Its practice and conquest takes the 
form of epistemological mechanism: the subject who self-
-portrays himself pictorially knows himself visually outside 
1  The Editio Princeps of De Pictura, was published in Basel in 1540. The Italian version was printed in Venice in 1547. However, from 1435 
onwards, numerous handwritten versions of the treatise, both in the Latin and the vernacular versions, began to circulate.
in but intellectually inside out. The pictorial self-portrait is 
thus intimately associated with self-awareness, but in an 
absolutely opposite way to the contemporary production 
of the selfie, a process through which the image under-
goes an ontological cut between the portrayed object 
and the being that produces it. 
The right to self-representation – as it means a clear intru-
sion into a sealed aulic world – is thus taken as an unpa-
ralleled and perennial liberal achievement. The artists, 
stripped of their statutes until the mid-fifteenth century, 
were the first to self-represent themselves in the works 
they then produced. The urgency of the artistic “Self” thus 
overlapped the existential smallness of the craftsman. 
Self-portrait thus assumes itself as an element of social 
integration in the sphere of those who command it. The 
Maecenas is portrayed because he pays, not because 
it is endowed with self-representation mechanisms. The 
early action of these mechanisms becomes particularly 
clear in the first images by three artists whose action 
played a preponderant role in the statutory affirmation 
of painters in the fifteenth century, namely through the 
creation of painted frontal self-portraits with a novelty – 
the artist directly confronting the observer of the work: 
see the paradigmatic case of the work Raising of the 
Son of Theophilus and St. Peter Enthroned, painted by 
Masaccio between 1425 and 1427 in the Brancacci 
Chapel in Florence; the panel The Just Judges of the 
magnificent Ghent Altar, completed by Jan Van Eyck 
in 1432; or the self-portrait painted by Rogier Van der 
Weyden between 1435 and 1450 in The Justice of 
Trajan and Herkinbald, and referred to by Nicolau de 
Cusa in The Vision of God as a display of a singular 
omnivision effect. These three works contain what it is 
believed to be the first artist self-portraits while clear sta-
tements of self-awareness and liberality. Following this 
process is also the alleged self-portrait on display at the 
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National Gallery and painted by Van Eyck in 1433 
(fi g. 01). At the top of the frame the artist inscribed as 
philosophical set of ideas: Johannes de Eyck me fecit; 
at the bottom, Als Ich Can, i.e., quo potest in literally 
translated as ‘as I can’. The painting, depicting the 
living image of the painter, thus resembles “as it can” 
the image of his high craftsman. The painting, thus 
formulated, truly confi gures, according to Gianlucca 
Cuozzo, a mirror capable of refl ecting the artist’s alter 
ego: “anyone who looks at the portrait should know 
that it’s an image of me that, no matter how faithful, is 
neither true nor perfect, capable, that is, of being car-
ried out with an even greater precision up to infi nity” 
(Cuozzo, 2018: 127).
Fig. 01. Eyck, Jan van. (1433). Portrait of a Man (Self-Portrait?). [online 
image]. Oil on oak. National Gallery, London. obtained from: 
https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/jan-van-eyck-
portrait-of-a-man-self-portrait.
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For Belting, the new pictorial typology developed in 
Flanders from the third decade of Quattrocento should 
be understood in the context of a social conflict that 
opposed the nobility to the new and emerging social 
realities. At the heart of this distant revolution lies, in 
fact, the origin of the contemporary Selfie, manifesting 
itself as an innovative aesthetic product, i.e., the true 
and mimetic representation of the individual as grantor 
of memory and social status. This new typology of re-
presentation will be responsible for the advent of a 
previously unpublished theme: the bourgeois portrait 
taken under a renewed design, that is, as a magic 
mirror of the human being in opposition to the idealized 
portrait of the nobility with purely aulic and / or sym-
bolic purposes (Belting, 2014: 29: Smith, 2004: 47). 
The contemporary subject, in portraying himself, con-
veys precisely an image value pointing out to this 
process.  The new, but also the old social portrait is 
thus characterized by two essential and, in a sense, 
paradoxical qualities: individuality and / or unique-
ness; and wholeness or completeness. If on the one 
hand the portrait has as its primary function to reveal 
what distinguishes the portrayed from the others, or 
even from itself if it was portrayed in a different period 
or under different circumstances, on the other hand it 
seeks to reveal what the portrayed has in common with 
the rest of humanity and what remains constant in it, 
regardless of place and time (Panofsky, 1971: 194). 
This process remains, from the perspective of Byung-Chul 
Han, inscribed in contemporary rituals of the search 
for otherness: “Today, everyone wants to be different 
from everyone else. But in this desire on the part of 
each to be different, the identical remains” (Han, 
2018: 30). Hence, the self-portrait of once and the 
contemporary Selfie demand the integration and con-
textualization of the individual in society – its ultimate 
purpose is the like. 
Like the contemporary selfie, the Quattrocento artist 
also represents himself integrated in the socio-ima-
ginary universe that he inhabits. Primordial traits of 
similar significance with the Selfie are there in the 
Flemish pictorial representations, where reflections of 
the painter are concealed on the mirrored surfaces. 
A faithfully represented mirror, armor, or helmet are 
not singularly constituted as such, but reified by retur-
ning the reflection of the world inhabited by the artist. 
Examples of this unique mechanism of indirect self-re-
presentation are clearly contained in numerous works 
by Jan van Eyck: see the specific case of the painter’s 
reflections on St. George’s armour in The Virgin and 
Child with Canon van der Paele, painted between 
1434 and 1436; or in the famous Arnolfini Portrait 
(fig. 02), where the reflection in the mirror in the back-
ground clearly illustrates the complexity of the self-re-
presentation mechanisms used by the artist. Accurate 
and relatively recent studies on the optical phenomena 
contained in both works by Jan Van Eyck and Robert 
Campin lead us, according to the authors, António 
Criminisi, Martin Kemp and Sing Bing Kang, to draw 
a set of conclusions whose impact certainly implies 
a broad and profound theoretical reflection around 
the usual conceptual assumptions of art history. Stem-
ming from an accurate multidisciplinary examination 
of Robert Campin’s Saint John and Donor (fig. 03) 
and Arnolfini Portrait, the authors establish a complex 
geometric, mathematical and computational analysis 
of the reflexes contained in the two convex mirrors re-
presented in both works and the conclusions we draw 
are surprising:
Whereas it may be possible to envisage an imagi-
nary view in a spherical mirror, it is inconceivable 
that such consistently accurate optical effects could 
have been achieved by a simple act of the ima-
gination. We are drawn to what seems to be the 
inescapable conclusion that the artist has directly 
observed and recorded the effects visible when ac-
tual figures and objects are located in a specific 
interior. Such a result means that, at some point, 
models must have been posed in exactly those po-
sitions occupied in the painting (…)” (Criminisi, 
Kemp e Kang, 2004: 117-118). 
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Fig. 02. Eyck, Jan van. (1434). Portrait of Giovanni(?) Arnolfi ni and his 
Wife. [online image]. Oil on oak. National Gallery, London. 
obtained from: https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/
jan-van-eyck-the-arnolfi ni-portrait#VideoPlayer95520.
Fig. 03. Campin, Robert. (1438). Saint John the Baptist and the 
Franciscan Heinrich von Werl. [online image]. Oil on oak. 
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This set of conclusions is a truly unexpected reality, 
showing at a glance that Selfie’s self-representative 
impulse, taken as the subject’s authorial reflection 
was there more even before that we often thought. 
These surfaces thus assume the typological value of 
the ‘magic mirror’ and support their self-representa-
tion. Through this mechanism, the artist demands 
recognition by the “other”, formalized through the 
restricted presential and social media he joins. Its im-
pact, however, becomes overwhelming as it emanates 
from the centre of aulic power. The artist serves the 
pamphlet purposes of the patrons, and by visually in-
tegrating himself with these mechanisms of statutory 
authority, he assumes an equivalent status. Their inte-
gration, parasitic and timid, is almost always done in 
the deep spheres. The challenge of direct gaze thus 
contrasts with the discreet positioning in the religious 
and social hierarchies represented. The epitome of 
this self-affirmation process is shown in the self-por-
trait of Alte Pinakotheke of Munich, which Albrecht 
Dürer painted in 1500 (fig. 04). Dürer, because he 
can, wakes up in this glorious year of 1500 metamor-
phosed in imaginem of God. His self-representation 
manifests itself simultaneously in three complementary 
spheres: the narcissistic operative, witnessed in the en-
tered formula2 ; the theological through the represen-
tation of the symbolic mirror of God; the philosophical 
by introducing the doctrine of the “absolute gaze” of 
Nicholaus of Cusa. Through these three mechanisms, 
Dürer assumes, in Belting’s view, an opposite position 
to that of the young Narcissus, that is, not an entan-
glement in self-love, therefore narcissistic-depressive, 
but an act of superior complexity: “The portrait has 
thus an excess of reference, because it is not limited 
only to the man of flesh and blood portrayed here, 
but reveals in it an absolute beauty that transcends 
him. The divine resemblance thus stands out in the full 
resemblance of the portrait with the face of Dürer” 
(Belting, 2011: 125). Representing the outside world 
thus asserts itself as the ultimate affirmation of power. 
2  Albertus Durerus Noricus ipſum me propriis ſic effingebam coloribus ætatis anno XXVIII: Albert Dürer of Nuremberg, I so depicted myself 
with colours, at the age of 28.
3  The conceptual anti-climax of Dürer’s transcendent portrait will come with the process characterized by Max Weber as “Disenchantment 
of the World” (Entzauberung). This will manifest itself through progressive rationalization and intellectualization, by the elimination of 
magical and animistic beliefs, as well as mysticism, metaphysics and by an exacerbated alienation of the individual. The spiritual world 
will become progressively empty and sterile. This alienation will give rise to a growing pessimism with evident reflexes in the processes 
of self-representation. This phenomenon is inscribed both in the moralizing and self-punishing character of Caravaggio’s self-portraits 
(1571-1610); as in the disenchantment and socioeconomic decay of Rembrandt’s self-portraits (1606-1669); as well as, in the plea for 
silence that Salvator Rosa’s self-portrait shows (1615-1675) (Houser, 1965: 89-90; Weber, 2015: 33-34).
Self-representation is instituted as the ultimate ‘luxury’ 
– the only procedural demand capable of overcoming 
both social exiguity and amnesia. Through the written 
formula applied to painting, Dürer confirms precisely 
the “notarial” nature of his work. At twenty-eight he 
paints himself with colour because he can: the affir-
mation of his power is clear; clear enjoyment of his 
status. The image thus produced does not reflect the 
tiny uniqueness of the Selfie, but rather a plural visual 
sense of multiple meanings. The “self” in Dürer takes 
on the nature of multiple Selves of wide significance – 
the selfie morphs into Selvie. 
Indeed, Like Narcissus, Dürer also lurks behind a sin-
gular act. His depiction, however, is the sublime3. For 
this reason, it doesn’t fall into the category which Bel-
ting calls ‘image abuse’. Its representation, far from 
the banality and grotesque, fully assumes the Icon’s 
formula: “The resemblance between icon and por-
trait, a metaphysical resemblance, leads to the sense 
of Dürer’s self-portrait. In this unusual portrait, face 
and mask, God’s own face and mask are printed and 
impressed with each other, to use photographic ter-
minology” (Belting, 2011: 126). His reflection thus 
constitutes an act of theological disobedience while 
simultaneously conferring on his face the beauty and 
nature of the sacred icon. Through this act the painter 
seems to evoke the transcendence of the magic mirror 
thus bringing back the classic concept of Kalokaga-
thia, that is, of the Greek concept of the good and 
the beautiful and the inextricable connection of these 
two concepts.  His statement seeks not only the har-
monization between beauty and supreme goodness 
but fundamentally the usurpation of categories usually 
regarded as the privilege of the ruling classes: social 
and intellectual virtue. From this perspective, artistic 
self-portrait is thus the first act of social disobedience 
in the image history of humanity. The contemporary 
Selfie – the trivialization of this achievement.
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 SELF-PORTRAIT IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION –
THE “AGE OF DEMOCRATIZATION”
One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. 
By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of co-
pies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction 
to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it 
reactivates the object reproduced (Benjamin, 1992: 79)
Fig. 04. Dürer, Albrecht. (1500). Self-Portrait at Twenty-Eight. [online image]. Oil on oak. Alte Pinakothek, Munich. obtained from: https://www.
sammlung.pinakothek.de/en/artwork/Qlx2QpQ4Xq/albrecht-duerer/selbstbildnis-im-pelzrock.
Democratization of photography has defi nitively alie-
nated the subject from the epistemic ‘action’ of self-
-portrayal. In the Photographic Herald and Amateur 
Sportsman of November 1889, Kodak announced pre-
cisely the end of this ontological milestone: “You press 
the button, we do the rest”. The advent of mass pho-
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tography thus characterizes two striking events in the 
imaginary universe: the end of artistic exclusivity in sel-
f-representation; and the full institution of the image as 
absolute truth. Photography, unlike painting, seemed to 
show reality as it was, without artifice, manipulation or 
idealization. As a record of reality, it seemed immune 
to any and all external influences that had hitherto obs-
cured the truthfulness of art. This mutation in the nominal 
value of image in the transformation of twentieth-cen-
tury European societies is clearly defined in Eric Hobs-
bawm’s The Age of Extremes. Indeed, for Hobsbawm 
the massification of photography during the twentieth 
century would assume an absolute documentary nature 
in light of the “illusory belief that the camera doesn’t 
lie” thus manifesting itself as a reflection of apparent 
authenticity: “men and women have learned to see rea-
lity through camera lenses” (Hobsbawm, 2011: 194).
A clear example of the transition between the pictorial 
image, manipulative and transcendent in its inventive 
nature, and the uncompromisingly ‘real’ photographic 
image, is present in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1752 co-
medy Narcissus, or the lover of himself. The fact that 
it was written about two hundred and fifty years after 
Dürer’s self-portrait but a century before the advent of 
photography, becomes extremely relevant because it 
gives this transition a clear ontological value. In the ori-
ginal comedy, Valère’s pictorial portrait is manipulated to 
make him look like a woman. As a result, and because he 
doesn’t recognize himself in the metamorphosed image, 
Valère falls in love with himself. Faced with this bizarre 
thing, Angelique questions the legitimacy of self-love and 
the need for approval as a mechanism for social integra-
tion: “After all, what do you find so ridiculous in him? 
Since he is lovable, is he so wrong to love himself, and 
do we not set the example for him? He aims to please. 
Ah! If that is a fault, what more charming virtue could 
a man offer to society?”. The timeliness of a text written 
in the mid-eighteenth century is underlined by Simon 
Critchley, who questions precisely the typological value of 
the image as conferring distinction and inequality, marks 
that characterize precisely the contemporary Selfie: “It is 
with this desire for distinction that the healthy ‘amour of 
soi’ or ‘self-love’ that defines human beings in a natural 
state begins to be transformed into a narcissistic amour 
propre or pride. For Rousseau, the origin of narcissism 
consists of this desire for social distinction, from a sense 
of one’s own importance. Thus, inequality and narcissism 
derive from the same source” (Critchley, 2015: 6, 62-63). 
This particularly narcissistic and affected universe de-
noted by Rousseau is also reflected in contemporary 
4  Despite being a self-preserving device, it is certain that the portability of mobile phones and the insane pursuit of the original selfie lead to 
countless accidental deaths every year. The resulting tragedy contains within itself the original pathos of Narcissus’s death.
imagery. A satirical print from the British Museum dating 
back to 1782 seems to illustrate precisely the banality of 
self-contemplation as a mechanism of social isolation that 
Rousseau’s comedy translates. An impeccably uniformed 
young officer watches his own reflection on the mirrored 
surface of a lake, thus causing the despair of a totally 
ignored young woman aspiring the role of wife (fig. 05). 
Like the lake that Valére contemplates, the contemporary 
subject also demands its reflection on the mirrored sur-
faces of the digital. The mobile phone is thus established 
as a portable mirror surface – a space where Narcissus 
never drowns before, it seems to emerge metamorphosed 
and renewed at every moment4. Byung-Chul Han denou-
nces precisely the centrality that the immanence of the 
reflection constitutes in today’s imaginary culture. The 
concept of smooth, polished, and the absolute absence 
of creases are, in his opinion, intrinsic symbols of the 
contemporary beauty (Han, 2016). 
Like the young Narcissus, the coeval subject delights 
only through the contemplation of his reflection. Ho-
wever, his presence is no longer restricted to the 
background but imposes itself before the reality that 
surrounds it. Its framing, being also parasitic like Fle-
mish painters, now asserts itself in the foreground. His 
attitude is one of defiance, feeling, narcissistic and of 
permanent self-love. The contemporary subject is thus 
unable to understand self-representation as a primor-
dial ‘luxury’. His production is that of the banal and re-
petitive gesture. The image he produces, as it depicts 
an immediate present, transitory and ephemeral, is 
never constituted as a point of ontological reflection. 
For Byung-Chul Han, this phenomenon translates into 
the establishment of what he calls a “feeling of empti-
ness”: “The addition to selfies does not have much to 
do with a healthy love of oneself: it is nothing more 
than walking in a void of a narcissistic self that was 
left alone. Before the inner emptiness, the subject tries 
in vain to produce himself” (Han, 2018: 35). This 
instituted self-representation manifests an absolute ab-
sence of references – he will never possess the inhe-
ritance of Dürer’s icon. His face has the quality of the 
mask. The authenticity and transcendence of pictorial 
self-portrait has given way to the banality, grotesque-
ness, and worthlessness of the Selfie. 
Thus, the photographic image assumes new com-
petences diametrically opposed to the seminal sote-
riological functions that are usually kinked to its in-
ception and development. This process promotes, in 
Belting’s view, a clear shift between the "thing" and 
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its image: “Images are today consumed as informa-
tion, thus sparing the general public the fatigue of 
reading. It’s information with the unspoken invitation 
to idolatry” (Belting, 2011: 24). Image, taken here 
as a simplifi er of speech, thus promotes the dysfunc-
tion of thought. However, since the beginning of its 
massive production and dissemination, image has not 
always assumed the same purpose and function and 
is still free from the exclusive sphere of the individual. 
In fact, until the dawn of the nineteenth century, it was 
almost always associated with an individual salvifi c 
discourse, whose contours took on a doctrinal and/or 
moralizing appearance and after this clearly became 
a distinguishing means between these two belligerent 
social groups. However, this nominal value of image, 
taken as a mirror/refl ection of the emerging societies 
of the twentieth century now has a clear solipsistic di-
mension. The “truth” once bestowed upon the image 
intensifi es the infi rmity of thought. While previously 
it granted social or group awareness, today image 
is trapped in the narrow psychic “bubble” of its pro-
ducer. The producer thus assumes, at the same time, 
the role of consumer and enhancer of his own image, 
a value that he later confi rms through the adhesion or 
refutation of his digital peers. 
This autophagic dimension of the image now takes on 
contours of absolute novelty. While on the one hand 
there has never been such a marked independence in 
both production and visual awareness of ourselves, 
on the other, the individual image has never before 
assumed such a despicable and prosaic value. This 
phenomenon resulted in what Han calls the narcissis-
tic-depressive subject. The reverberation of his world 
happens to the extent that it constantly revises itself 
in its refl ection – a kind of mise en abyme where the 
subject, like Valère, “drowns” passionately in his 
own image: “Depression is primarily a narcissistic
Fig. 05. Bowles, Carington. 1782. Narcissus and the Nymph Echo. 
[online image]. Mezzotint hand-coloured. The British Museum. 
Registration number: 1935,0522.1.83. obtained from: https://
www.britishmuseum.org/collection/image/148334001.
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affliction. It’s an excessive and pathologically inverted 
relationship of the individual with himself (…)” (Han, 
2016: 75). This self-awareness clearly formalizes the 
traits of a society ruled by a singular paradox, i.e., a 
society that despairs in the pursuit of a singular indi-
vidualism by diluting the “I” into an absurd collecti-
vism. Thus, individualism nowadays takes on contours 
of curious historical dissociation, i.e., constantly pro-
moting the search for personal and identity imagery 
through selective imitation of peers. This mechanism 
may be the reason behind the establishment of an ori-
ginal imaginary phenomenon: if from the perspective 
of the sender there is the illusory sensation of achieving 
a resounding originality; From the point of view of the 
recipient, however, this has almost always contours 
of obvious banality. The receiver tends to banalise, 
integrate and normalize the external image in con-
trast with its illusory originality, thus imposing a clear 
ambiguity on identity processes. The visual thinking of 
the “other – integrated, reformulated and consecrated 
in the operative mechanics of the “I” – almost always 
translates into illusory and original novelty. 
In this post-digital age, we are thus confronted for the 
first time in the history of mankind with challenges of 
urgency, that is, the need to recover and defend at all 
costs the space established between peripheral and 
individual and between one individual and the others. 
Within the space of a decade or so, the traditional 
generational barriers were removed and replaced by 
shapeless and artificial age horizontality, translated 
into a diffuse and depersonalized mass. Depersona-
lization is now an imperative condition for a broad 
sociocultural reach, that is, the more the depersonali-
zation of an ideal is emphasized, the larger and more 
totalitarian it becomes. Thus, social media themselves 
constitute a diffuse and illusory leveller of many hete-
rogeneities, confusing and masking some modern so-
ciocultural markers: cultural reality – economic reality 
– social reality. Through the manipulated self-portrait 
and the emulation of character, mannerisms and pos-
tures alien to the subject’s own internal reality one thus 
seeks to achieve a notorious sociocultural amalgam. 
Notwithstanding the falsehood of the identity traits 
thus established, its illusory penchant almost always 
leads to a perpetuation of the model: on the one 
hand given the fear of the emptiness that “being” it-
self is faced with, now deprived of its identity chains 
and equally levelled; on the other, given the very 
desire for modular perpetuity that social media in-
duce and establish. This mechanism promotes what 
Belting calls ‘image abuse”, i.e., an inductive pro-
cess that makes it impossible to ultimately ascertain 
its truthfulness: “It’s impossible for us to see both 
its production and the falsehood carried out in and 
with them (…) We would have lost all control over 
them if we loose the ability to tell between proof 
and falsification” (Belting, 2011: 35). Self-image, 
taken here as selfie but at the same time assuming 
the traditional value of self-portrait, thus assumes 
itself as the absolute icon of this age. Selfie and 
the processes of self-representation thus become the 
apogee of what Günther Anders referred to in 1956 
as ‘icon mania’, which Belting defines as a mecha-
nism of evasion of oneness: “We try to abolish the 
limits where our life unfolds. The simultaneous con-
sumption of the same images offer the sensation of 
living in a world without social and cultural barriers 
– which is undoubtedly a self-delusion” (Belting, 
2011: 23). The subject thus seeks to achieve the 
ultimate metamorphosis of his daily reality through 
the manipulation operated in his self-image.
FROM THE "AGE OF CATASTROPHE" TO THE "AGE OF BANALIZATION"
When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning from a restless 
dream he saw that he had become a monstrous insect in his 
sleep (Kafka, 2007: 9).
The image overlaps sign and word simply because 
the latter formulates both a convention and demand, 
in Belting’s view, a clear compromise as regards its 
deciphering: “We do not believe as much in signs as 
in images, but we have to decipher and interpret them 
(Belting, 2011: 10). The traditional vehicles of cogni-
tive distinction, resting to a great extent on the produc-
tion and dissemination of original thought, have thus 
given way to forms of language sustained almost ex-
clusively on image. The complexity of the written code, 
used mostly in pre-digital mass media has been turned 
into visual phonemes of singular simplicity. These thus 
approach a seminal linguistic matrix focused exclusi-
vely on the set of references and stripped of some of 
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the most sophisticated foundations of language: the 
case of signs; of analogy; of allegory; of metonymy; 
of metaphor; of symbolism; and meaning. This see-
mingly ambiguous setback becomes even more pro-
blematic when confronted with the obvious insepara-
bility between thought and language as defined by 
Max Müler: “(…) Language and thought are insepa-
rable, and (…) a disease of language is therefore the 
same as a disease of thought” (Müler apud Cassirer, 
1992: 109). Thus, verbal language tends to assume 
an increasingly onomatopoeic and liminal character, 
assisting the decoding system usually associated with 
nonverbal language – “Language and culture become 
superficial and vulgar” (Han, 2016: 29). 
However, and unlike the present subject, the pre-di-
gital age would be described exclusively through lin-
guistic and verbal resources. The transfer or commu-
nication on their state of mind or identity would occur 
mainly through epistolary models, never imagery. 
This practice assumes a reflection, a plunge into the 
identity of being – ultimately – the realization of a 
psychological self-portrait. The contemporary subject 
doesn’t make take the plunge, but rather dwells on the 
surface through the superficial self-portrait. This super-
ficial image – of immediate understanding – seeks the 
superficial acceptance of identity pairs. This mecha-
nism results in one of the perverse effects that the selfie 
of social networks promotes, i.e., conversion of the 
“other” into a mere peripheral and visual and identity 
reverberation of the producing subject. This metamor-
phosis mechanism thus translates into a system of mu-
tual recognition, of specular and encomiastic nature. 
I recognize and approve the “other” in proportion to 
the recognition and approval that this “other” gives 
me. This acceptance mechanism is thus behind the ex-
ponential increase of social media users – its growth 
will be unstoppable as will the need for integration 
and approval that the subject places on his peers. He 
is desperately eager to be seen and to be liked. Con-
temporary society is thus delighted in the exact mea-
sure of a single word composed of four letters only – 
like.  The despair that “like me” translates rests equally 
in the secret desire of wanting the “other” to be preci-
sely like me. The generalized volition of approval thus 
lead to the generalization of homogeneity. The desire 
5  The monstrous being that Kafka imagines, diluted inside, rigid outside, is a symbol of extreme dehumanization, an ontological inversion 
of being. The contemporary desire for self-representation also follows a similar model. The selfie reproduces only a rigid and narcissistic 
version of the exterior, but a total dilution of the portrait’s identity and ontology. This illusion clearly does not satisfy the subject’s desire 
for identity, but rather reproduces Gregor’s original emptiness.
for metamorphosis into what the “other” represents 
was never that desired as then.
However, this desire for metamorphosis and alterity 
today takes on a totally opposite proportion to that 
experienced in the first half of the 20th century – the 
era of catastrophe (Hobsbawm, 2011: 190-191). 
Despite the massive advent of photography and the 
democratization of self-image – this era will be shaken 
by a strong sense of incomprehensibility of the human 
condition. The feeling of exclusion or of not belonging 
to the collective, was superimposed on all the mecha-
nisms of individuation, whether literary or imagetic. 
This fear of the individual’s metamorphosis into a col-
lective and anonymous being, has now given way to a 
deep desire for belonging and social dilution.
A contemporary Gregor Samsa would not wake up to 
the nightmare of functional depersonalization that his 
metamorphosis into a gigantic insect represents, but 
rather to the identity and visual urgency towards his 
peers. A Kafkian social universe in everything similar 
to that characterized in Metamorphosis that would 
wake up having the same nightmare: However, thanks 
to the imaginary dilution of the subject in the “other”, 
he would not realize this. Kafka finds in the metaphor 
of man’s metamorphosis into an insect the symbol of 
his extreme dehumanization, i.e., an inverted being 
diametrically opposed to the morphological norm of 
the human being: skeleton on the outside and visce-
rally diluted on the inside. Like this representation, the 
coetaneous subject is also inverted in its ontological 
sense, that is, it shows a full external imaginary signifi-
cance but is however diluted and empty inside5. Thus, 
and in light of the imagery and depersonalizing whir-
lwind that social media promote, one might wonder 
whether all Gregor Samsas have been eradicated in 
this post-digital age.  We don’t believe it, but there 
are substantial differences that mitigate his condition. 
Indeed, today all the Gregor Samsa’s of the world 
communicate with each other; all share their identity 
void before falling asleep; and all without exception 
reverberate the reflection of the emptiness of their exis-
tential statement the morning after. 
Along with this reality, the contemporary world shows 
another curious and innovative narrative overlap stem-
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ming from the tragic tradition of the children’s tales. 
The Kafkian myth of the decay and abandonment of 
‘Being’, diluted in the post-industrial effluvia, is thus 
overlapped with the myth of the magical mirror of 
the German tale Schneewittchen known through the 
Grimm brother’s version as Snow White. The specular 
reflection plays in this tale the role of palliative, still 
enclosed in the long classical tradition of Kalokagatia. 
Remember that for the Greeks, good existed only in the 
concentricity of the beautiful, pushing ugliness and evil 
away into periphery – as this were interrelated and 
interdependent concepts. The reflection on the mirror; 
genuine ontological peripheral, thus translates into an 
immediate and imperative redemption, he only assu-
rance of the survival of the evil character of the story. 
The Selfie as confirmation/approval of the ‘other’ is 
a perfect metaphor for the magical mirror of the Sch-
neewittchen tale. The image it produces, according to 
current standards of beauty, almost always represents 
a being asleep being to his inner reality. 
Let us now imagine for a moment that Gregor Samsa 
had in his circumscribed habitat the benevolent agree-
ment of the magic mirror. Endowed with this peripheral 
oracle, Samsa would seek salvation through social di-
lution and the approval of his peers, precisely what 
social media promise – agreement and horizontality 
in the meaning of life. The Computer, provided with a 
“social” network, thus becomes a magical mirror and 
the ultimate palliative for the hardship of the emptiness 
that the contemporary “being” is faced with. Each 
user is himself the “Being” who inhabits the mirror, 
qualifying and attributing the ultimate meaning of the 
action, the word, the choice, the destiny of the “Other” 
through a simple like. We need however to reflect on 
the nature of the matter, i.e., whether the personifi-
cation of evil that the Grimm brothers inscribe would 
lead to salvation by repeating the famous mantra: 
My mirror, my mirror, is there anyone more beautiful 
than Me? In the original tale the mirror is deprived of 
the faculty of lying, but we envision here the process 
through which lie is formulated as a survival mecha-
nism. The lie always represents an escape from reality, 
from inexorable peer censorship, and inevitably from 
punishment. Therefore, what lie institutes is rather an 
alternative universe where the being attains, through 
ignorance, the benevolence of forgiveness. The mirror 
doesn’t lie, not because it’s intrinsically good, but be-
cause no survival imperative arises for it. The survival 
of the oracle should thus depend on the content of ans-
wers, and the metaphorical mirror, through a process 
of self-preservation, would immediately begin to lie, 
that is, to create benevolent and alternative universes 
for its sphere of comfort. And what mantra would 
Gregor Samsa achieve for his own identity salvation? 
It would be through a qualifying formula – Tell me my 
mirror, is there anyone emptier than Me? Or through 
a quantifying formula – Tell me my mirror, is there 
anyone as empty as me? One way or another, the 
result is always a reinforcement of Samsa’s identity 
buttress; yes, it’s true that the emptiness remains, but 
now this emptiness is the norm, being quantified, qua-
lified, promoted and distributed by others. 
The Samsa’s of today have generated a new iden-
tity centre through the existential parity promoted by 
communication. Unlike the original oracle, these new 
social “mirrors” lie, and do so consciously. Alternative 
universes must be instituted so that their very existence 
is preserved and grounded, hence the importance of 
validating the reflection of the ‘other’ as a mechanism 
of self-preservation, that is, as the grounding of the 
‘Being’ itself. Just look at a group of people who have 
no apparent relationship with each other every day to 
realize that the mirror no longer prefigures a static and 
immovable object but is present in all social interac-
tions. Its portability has been ensured with the aim of 
perpetuating this identity fulfilment when the “Being” 
is threatened with more weaknesses, that is, in direct 
contact with the “Other”. Thus, the contemporary sub-
ject, provided with his new “social” peripheral, shuns 
the judgment that the physical gaze of the “other” al-
ways implies, through the comfort of the identity con-
vergence with the virtual “other”. This reality confirms 
what Kafka calls ‘ghost communication’, that is, re-
mote communication as an impediment to the absolute 
understanding of the ‘other’: “(…) How did we come 
to the idea that people can get along with each other 
through letters? (…) Written kisses don’t reach their 
destination, they are drunk by ghosts along the way” 
(Kafka, 2018: 214; Han, 2019: 105).
It’s worth mentioning however that in the original 
Metamorphosis this mechanism of confrontational 
communication is fully absent. This absence is an ex-
tremely relevant aspect as it establishes an obligatory 
chronological counterpoint to the present. Indeed, 
and unlike the post-digital subject, Gregor Samsa is 
not confronted at all with his own reflection. It doesn’t 
allow him to the limit of his strengths to be seen as 
intending to maintain the integrity of his privacy. The 
Metamorphosis introduces us to a Gregor Samsa lying 
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on his back on the bed and trying hard to understand 
what’s wrong with him. From this point of view, we are 
before a subject still trying to understand and to find 
the roost of his existence, thus opposing to the current 
subject who only demands approval and recognition 
in the face of the “reflection” he sends. Gregor’s first 
impulse is to institute an internal anamnesis in order to 
feel and understand what is going on with his body. 
He never searches his reflection and his perception is 
exclusively sensitive and non-visual. Gregor “feels” the 
bulging and useless dimension of his new body, which 
he can see little or nothing at all. Moreover, Kafka’s 
description of the room is brief in this respect – there 
is no mirror. Incidentally, apparently no mirror is pre-
sent in the Samsa family home. The Samsa family still 
seems to dwell in a pre-image world. In Gregor’s room 
there is only a single visual reference – a photograph 
of a lady in a small hat clipped from a newspaper. 
This small glimpse of the social world, outside and 
diametrically opposed to the one in which Gregor 
inhabits, seems to constitute a reference window from 
another universe, distant and unreachable. Moreover, 
all descriptions and confrontations with reality will be 
literary and dependent on direct or indirect observers. 
Confirmation of his monstrosity is given to him exclu-
sively through the eyes of others, his family, thereby 
confronting him with a reality that Gregor does not 
visually reach in its entirety. The Kafkian world consti-
tutes itself as a presential world by nature, and commu-
nication takes on a dimension diametrically opposed 
to the phantasmatic communication. Gregor’s self-por-
trait thus does not depend on any external and visual 
peripherals, but on a perception of his Self, of the ar-
chetype of himself. 
Remember, however, that with the advent of photo-
graphy, the individual will have been limited to the 
smallness of his reality. Perhaps for this reason Gregor 
Samsa is stripped of any mechanism of imagery self-
-representation. The intrinsic veracity of photography, 
like the “magic mirror” that doesn’t lie, is not compa-
tible with the sensitive-depressive world that the sub-
ject of the twentieth century now inhabits. It is no coin-
cidence that Kafka gave detailed instructions to his 
editor in order for the cover would not visually illustrate 
Gregor’s metamorphosis. He feels like an insect but, 




as an insect. In 1916 edition of Die Verwandlung, the 
cover made by Ottomar Starke features a tormented 
man who hides his face with his hands (fig. 06). 
This specific action, that of covering the vision, brings 
the reader to an entirely psychological and sensitive 
world, given that much of the action takes place pre-
cisely inside Gregor’s consciousness. From the literary 
point of view, it’s a skilful work of imaginary and descrip-
tive occlusion, but there are numerous contemporary pic-
torial examples whose similarity to the Kafkian psycho-
logical self-portrait is clearly there. In fact, and given 
that the advent of photography had long dispensed with 
the necessary pictorial realism, the pictorial self-portrait 
thus became also a mirror of the artist’s archetypal and 
psychological reality. In the same year that Kafka wrote 
Metamorphosis, several painters looked at each other 
under the same visceral and distorted angle, establishing 
self-portraits in everything equivalent to metamorphosis. 
The conceptual formula of self-representation as the su-
preme ‘luxury’ and engine vehicle of statutory affirma-
tion was definitively ignored. Henceforth, self-represen-
tation would imply confrontation, and this confrontation 
translated almost always into rejection. Europe, torn by 
social and political tensions and under the emerging 
threat of the Great War, produced monsters, and these 
dictated the imagery codes in vogue then. If we look at 
the self-portrait Ludwig Meidner painted in 1912, Der 
Selbstmörder6, the suicidal, we find precisely the same 
phatos of the metamorphosis of man torn by an oppres-
sive reality. His body is dry, distorted and manipulated. 
The gaze diverges to a disturbing infinite. Like Meidner, 
Egon Schiele would also self-represent abundantly in 
the same way. Both his Self Portrait with Raised Bare 
Shoulder7 and his Self Portrait with Lowered Head8, 
painted in 1912, have the same psychological drive. 
Kafka, Meidner and Schiele thus denote a common con-
cern in focusing the sense of self-representation, not as a 
reflection of its external form, but as a sensitive mirror of 
a collapsing inner world (fig. 07). This reality results from 
the early decline of Narcissus. In fact, after the strictly 
visual plunge into the authorial and statutory self-love of 
previous centuries the twentieth century brought about 
the sensitive and disturbed discomfort of the contempo-
rary subject’s consciousness. When confronted with the 
mirror that the gaze of the “other” represents, the reflec-
tion he sees almost always translates into a distortion of 
his intrinsic reality.
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Fig. 06. Starke, Ottomar. (1916). Die Verwandlung. [online image]. 
Leipzig: Kurt Wolff Verlag. obtained from: https://www.
pinterest.com/pin/222576406554255490/
Fig. 07. Schiele, Egon. (1911). Self-Portrait. [online image]. Watercolor, 
gouache, and graphite on paper. The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, New York. obtained from: https://www.metmuseum.org/
art/collection/search/483438
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Indeed, the sensitive perception of oneself and the out-
side world will be constantly challenged by Gregor 
Samsa through direct confrontation with others and 
the world. At one point he wonders, “Have I become 
less sensitive?” (Kafka, 2007: 46). The visual and di-
rect return of this world will also be gradually put to 
the test. Gregor will see less and less. At one point, 
the only perception he has will be that of a universe 
stricken with his own sensations, “for it was now be-
coming more myopic” (Kafka, 2007: 54). Also, the 
world of communication will be truncated, presenting 
new and strange challenges. Initially, Gregor clearly 
understands what he is told, but when he speaks, the 
voice that comes out of his body betrays the primary 
function of transmission of his ideas: “– Do you unders-
tand a single word of what he said? – The manager 
asked his parents. “He’s he perhaps wanting to make a 
fool of us?” (…) – It was an animal voice (…)” (Kafka, 
2007: 26). At the end of the narrative, communication 
ceased completely. Gregor already dwelled in absolute 
muteness, fi lled only by the noise of his mind. “If only 
he could understand us – said his father, in a somewhat 
inquiring tone” (Kafka, 2007: 96-97). It will be in this 
desolate universe, without any glimpse of visual or hea-
ring communication, isolated and immobile in the midst 
of oppressive darkness, that Gregor Samsa will die to 
the great relief of his family. Gregor himself becomes a 
ghost – far, therefore, from face-to-face communication, 
thus far from the physical reality of the Kafkian “kiss”. 
Let us return, however, once again to the issue pro-
posed above, that is, to imagine that Gregor Samsa 
wakes up today from his restless dream. The world 
that welcomes him, diametrically opposed to what 
Franz Kafka envisioned in 1912, will present you 
with new challenges but also new opportunities. 
Samsa inhabits a world where his refl ection is abun-
dant. His self-image, profusely present at every mo-
ment of his life, completely fi lls his universe. In his 
mobile phone inhabits a whole visual universe of infi -
nite possibilities (fi g. 08). Gregor wakes up from his 
restless dream and feels like a monstrous insect. His 
fi rst impulse is to visit his social media in the secret 
urge to fi nd someone else in his condition. Everyone 
he sees is in fact in the same situation. He quickly 
sends his self-portrait with the hashtag:  #wokeupli-
kethis – not without fi rst making a slightly affected 
pose. A moment later, he hears his sister in the next 
room laughing abundantly. He only infers her plea-
sure when she confi rms her acceptance through a 
like. Few moments after shower of likes fl ood the 
visual and sonic space of his morning. Gregor felt 
integrated and appeased in his Metamorphosis 
as the entire network responded to him reactively.
In an instant, his entire visual universe was trans-
formed into an insect, and the insect that is, annulled 
in its uniqueness. The contemporary Gregor Samsa 
soothes through his selfi e and his self-representation 
his inner emptiness.  He no longer dies in the absurd 
loneliness of the room, but his condition is visually 
democratized. Metamorphosis into the “other” be-
came his life quest. Its disclosure, the immanent sign 
of Narcissus.
Fig. 08. Rocha, Kaique. [2019]. Person Taking a Photo Using Iphone. 
[online image]. obtained from: https://www.pexels.com/photo/
phone-iphone-taking-photo-selfi e-36675/
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